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 There are many who argue that high-technology industries are the bearers of the new knowledge economy. They
argue that Europe should focus on knowledge intensive activities in such frontier areas as ICT, biotechnology and
professional services. A related claim is that mature, traditional or LMT industries are likely to move to less developed 
countries.  
 We claim that these perspectives are seriously mistaken. Taken together, LMT activities account for somewhere
in the region of 97% of all economic activity in Europe. All European economies are trade-specialized in LMT 
products. All LMT industries are innovative  they generate significant proportions of their sales from new and
technological changed products. Many LMT industries and products are surviving and growing on the basis of
technological upgrading, high-grade design skills and the intensive application of knowledge to innovation. They have
unique forms of industrial organisation and knowledge creation, complex links to science and technology knowledge
infrastructures, and important regional dimensions. 
 Here we focuses on the creation and use of knowledge in LMT industries. We claim that in the future the
European economy, especially in the context of enlargement, will continue to rest on LMT activities. This implies that
growth, competitiveness, cohesion and employment in Europe will depend on the performance of LMT industries. At
the present time, the knowledge-creation problems faced by such sectors are neglected in policy arenas  but this will 
become a major challenge for EU innovation, technology and research policy. 
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Summary 
 
 
In the mid-1980s, the OECD invented an economic classification that has had a spectacular 
career - the concept of high-technology, medium-technology and low-technology industries. 
This taxonomy was based primarily on the R&D intensity of industries, meaning the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to output. Industries with an R&D/Turnover ratio of more than four percent 
were classified as high-tech. Those between one and four percent were medium-tech, and 
those less than one percent were low-tech. This schema has become widely used in business, 
in policy discussions and in economic analysis. It links with other classifications that seek to 
differentiate science-based or knowledge intensive industries from more prosaic activities. 
 
This paper addresses a central problem for economic analysis and public policy in Europe. 
Should Europe focus on so-called high-technology or science-based industries in attempting 
to solve growth and employment problems? Or should it look to the growth prospects within 
the industries on which the European economy is actually based: low-technology and 
medium-technology industries (which we call LMT industries) in manufacturing and 
services? These questions are the focus of a European Commission research project called 
PILOT  Policy and Innovation in Low-Tech (see www.pilot-project.org). This paper is a 
first output from the project  it addresses key issues in understanding LMT industries, 
mainly in terms of knowledge intensity and use. 
 
There are many who argue that high-technology industries are the bearers of the new 
knowledge economy. They argue that Europe should focus on knowledge intensive activities 
in such frontier areas as ICT, biotechnology and professional services. A related claim is that 
mature, traditional or LMT industries are likely to move to less developed countries.  
 
We claim that these perspectives are seriously mistaken. Taken together, LMT activities 
account for somewhere in the region of 97% of all economic activity in Europe. All European 
economies are trade-specialized in LMT products. All LMT industries are innovative  they 
generate significant proportions of their sales from new and technological changed products. 
Many LMT industries and products are surviving and growing on the basis of technological 
upgrading, high-grade design skills and the intensive application of knowledge to innovation. 
They have unique forms of industrial organisation and knowledge creation, complex links to 
science and technology knowledge infrastructures, and important regional dimensions. 
 
Here we focuses on the creation and use of knowledge in LMT industries. We claim that in 
the future the European economy, especially in the context of enlargement, will continue to 
rest on LMT activities. This implies that growth, competitiveness, cohesion and employment 
in Europe will depend on the performance of LMT industries. At the present time, the 
knowledge-creation problems faced by such sectors are neglected in policy arenas  but this 
will become a major challenge for EU innovation, technology and research policy.  
  1
Introduction 
In recent meetings in Lisbon and Barcelona, EU Heads of Government adopted and then 
reaffirmed the objective of making the EU the worlds most competitive knowledge-based 
economy by 2010. How this objective might be reached has been debated since then, 
focussing especially on an important target indicator selected to reflect the objective, 
namely that the EU should achieve an R&D/GDP ratio of three percent.  
 
Both the objective and the indicator raise problems of interpretation. How should we 
understand the knowledge economy, and how can its performance be measured? Is R&D the 
only or best indicator of knowledge creation, and if not, what are the implications for the 
innovation potential of European industry? This paper argues that such questions have often 
attracted simplistic answers  we suggest that the knowledge economy has been too often 
identified with high-tech, high-R&D industries. These industries are small and 
unrepresentative of the European economic structure. Concentrating on them obscures 
important processes of knowledge creation and innovation in the modern European 
economies. In this paper we argue that low and medium technology (LMT) industries are of 
great and continuing economic importance in advanced economies. We focus on how they 
create and use knowledge, arguing that LMT industries intensively create and deploy many 
forms of production-relevant knowledge, including basic science results, and that they are 
central to the knowledge economy. 
 
What is the background to the policy obsession with high tech industries? In large part it 
reflects the idea that ongoing societal change in modern societies can be characterised as an 
emerging Knowledge Society (cf. Drucker, 1994; Stehr, 1994; Willke, 1998; David and 
Foray, 2003) or Learning Economy (cf. Lundvall and Borrás, 1997). These writers and 
others share the idea that modern organisations and societies are undergoing a fundamental 
change process, resting on an enhanced significance of knowledge as a productive force and 
asset. Continual innovation is seen as a decisive determinant of economic and social 
development, accompanied by a restructuring of work processes and organisation. In this 
process the generation, diffusion and utilisation of knowledge has become a core 
characteristic of firms and economic activity as a whole. These discourses on the emerging 
knowledge society describe  beyond any doubt  important tendencies of economic and 
social development. We share the view that knowledge is an increasingly important 
resource, but we dispute much of the conventional wisdom about how the knowledge 
economy is structured, and its implications for economic trends and hence policy measures. 
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On the one hand, the knowledge economy is usually identified with a very small number of 
research-based or science-based activities, especially information and communications 
technologies (ICT), and biotechnology. On the other hand, it is often argued that as a 
consequence of increased knowledge intensity the economies of industrialised countries in 
Europe and elsewhere are going through at least two great changes (Carson, 1998):  
 
• A significant element of industrial production is moving from its traditional sites to 
developing countries. The classic example is the exodus of textiles from the rich world 
over the past three decades. This applies particularly to labour-intensive mature 
industries: quite soon, it is argued, many big western firms in such industries will have 
more employees and even customers in developing countries than in developed ones.  
• The second change is that, in many industrialised countries, the balance of economic 
activity is swinging from manufacturing to services. Even in Germany and Japan, which 
rebuilt so many factories after 1945, manufacturings general share of jobs of the whole 
economy is declining very fast, in favour of high tech manufacturing and services. 
 
Particularly in Western countries, these alleged trends have caused a debate about an 
ongoing process of de-industrialisation with origin in the 1970s already (cf. Fröbel et al., 
1977). By the end of the 1980s, many American and European experts had come to believe 
that their countries industries were being hollowed out as many basic activities moved to 
other areas (see especially Dertouzos et al., 1989). At its most extreme, the argument was 
that only high technology, knowledge intensive activities would survive in the rich 
countries. But all in all, we would argue, it has not been like that. A change is happening, 
but it is not simply a destructive change. Rather the industrial sectors of many countries are 
reorganising themselves in a new economic environment. The result is that many allegedly 
threatened mature or traditional or low-tech industries are not only still located in their 
former home countries, but they are also very competitive and successful on world markets.  
 
It is true that the main feature of the current change process is intensified innovation 
activities of many companies, based on the growing importance and utilisation of 
knowledge and knowledge work. This change has important implications for corporate 
strategies and behaviour (see Lazonick 2004, forthcoming, for an account of this). To 
mobilise knowledge and skills, companies have to introduce and finance specific innovation 
strategies. These strategies are mainly aimed at changing their traditional organisational and 
personnel structures as well as their conventional styles of utilising technologies. On the 
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level of the corporation, organisational integration towards innovation strategies becomes a 
key challenge. On the level of work organisation, more indirect forms of co-ordination are 
necessary alongside the conventional forms of hierarchical control and co-ordination. This 
increases the importance of the employees commitment, motivation and initiative, 
especially in new forms of work organisation. The participative use of information 
technologies, the greater importance of organisational culture and the increased impact of 
inter-organisational production networks are also central elements both in changes in 
industrial organisation and structure. 
 
However these phenomena are by no means specific to high-technology activities. They 
hold true also for industrial sectors that can be termed low-tech, producing mature 
products like furniture, clothing or light bulbs (cf. The Economist, 1998; Maskell, 1998; 
Palmberg, 2001). In the public discourse on the emerging knowledge society there is a firm 
belief that the high-potential and growth sectors are to be found among the industrial sectors 
that are engaged in new activities, innovative technologies and intensive research and 
development. The dominant view, in other words, is that such high-tech industries hold 
the key to the future. Such industries are identified with knowledge-intensive sectors, 
whereas the LMT sectors are usually regarded as based on low levels of knowledge, without 
a real future in many industrialised countries. Only the high-tech sectors offer prospects for 
development, and therefore, so the argument continues, it makes sense that economic and 
science-technology policymakers should favour them.  
  
This argument simply overlooks a key fact: that in all industrialised countries there is a 
large sector of LMT industries, in manufacturing as well as in service sectors. This holds 
true for the industrialised countries of Western Europe and as well as for the transition 
economies of Middle and Eastern Europe with their basis of traditional and mature 
industries. The empirical evidence is strong and the facts are surprising. Between 90 and 97 
percent of GDP in EU countries is accounted for by activities which are classified as non-
high tech according to OECD classification routines (cf. OECD, 1999). Figure 1 shows the 
share of high-tech industries in manufacturing value-added for the Triad from 1980 to 1996 
(time period and coverage reflect data availability, but there seem to be no significant 
changes if we look outside EU-9 or examine the late 1990s). There is clearly rather little 
structural chagne  the share of high tech industries in manufacturing increases between 
1980 and 1984 by between 2 and 4 percentage points for each of the Triad members, after 
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which is remains relatively stable. We should note that these are shares of manufacturing 
which in each region is less than 25% of GDP and falling throughout the period. 
 
 
Figure 1 
High-tech industries' share of value added for total manufacturing. 1980-1996.
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Source: STEP Group from OECD, Industrial Structure database. 
 
Even before the recent industrial downturn led by the ICT industry (classified of course as 
high tech) many of the fastest growing sectors in the economy were in fact neither R&D 
intensive nor particularly science-based (Smith, 2003). In international trade, most of the 
advanced economies are specialized in LMT industries, and this specialization does not 
affect their growth performance (van Hulst and Olds, 1993). Such sectors generate 
significant quantities of innovation output, in the sense of sales of new and technologically 
changed products, and invest significant resources in innovation (Smith 2001).  
 
Let us ask a specific question about what is going on in such industries: why is it that in the 
face of globalization, in which LMT industries are supposed to migrate to developing 
economies, the furniture industry survives in Europe? In fact it not only survives, it is one of 
the most important industries in Europe - it has 65,000 firms, with nearly half a million 
employees, and an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent (which is faster than the growth of 
European GNP). Over the 30-year period 1961-1990, furniture was the second-fastest 
growing product group in OECD manufacturing trade, surpassed only by computers and 
  
5
peripherals. This is despite a significant increase in international competition in furniture, 
from Mexico, Eastern Europe and Taiwan (Smith 2003). 
 
To some extent, the industry has been reshaped by integration and economies of scale, with 
firms like IKEA and Habitat reaching mass markets. But European competitiveness has 
been based on rapid product and process innovation, and the transformation of furniture into 
a flexible, design-based and knowledge-based production system. Recent research has 
shown that learning in furniture rests on local innovation systems, characterised by inter-
firm collaboration, good quality regional infrastructures, access to high-grade design 
resources, and highly skilled labour forces. Complex patterns of specialization make this an 
innovative and growing industry in Europe (see Lorenzen 1998 for a major detailed study).  
 
Borrowing a concept from Kaldor (1985) we may thus argue that the stylised facts of the 
EU industrial experience indicate that high tech industries are not nearly as important for 
industrial and economic change as the dominant science and technology discourse assumes. 
Consequently there are strong arguments for analysing the mechanisms behind industrial 
and technical change in those parts of the economy in which these mechanisms have been 
ignored in recent decades. Central among these are LMT activities  they include major 
activities across the whole of the economic structure, in mining and extraction, in 
agriculture, in manufacturing, and in both private and public services. 
 
The intention of this paper is to contribute to the study of such industries by reviewing some 
of the central issues involved in knowledge creation, innovation and change in LMT sectors. 
So we review knowledge of conceptual and empirical issues related to technologies and 
industries that are certainly out of fashion, or assumed to disappear  or at least to disappear 
from industrialised countries  in ongoing structural change driven by globalization.  
 
This paper is not a comprehensive survey of the literature on low-tech industries. Rather we 
focus on areas we collectively identify as highly relevant for further research and for a 
deeper understanding of the low-tech world. The paper is structured as follows.  
 
• In section 1 the focus is on the background to the high-tech/low-tech classification  the 
development of the high-tech race within OECD countries and the work within the 
OECD related to the high-tech  low-tech dimension. 
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• Section 2 provides a short discussion of the role of science in industrial and technical 
change - the present discussion is put into its historical and epistemological context.  
• Section 3 explores concepts of knowledge formation which we take to be a broad 
concept including far more than science. Being by definition non R&D-related, much of 
the knowledge formation in LMT industries must be found in those activities which fall 
outside R&D statistics. Tacit knowledge is of relevance here  but in a specific way also 
codified knowledge. We focus on the specificity of knowledge in low-tech industries 
and the organisation of its industrial activities. We explore the concept of practical 
knowledge and the role of intelligent organisation in mobilising the creativity of human 
capital in relation to LMT industries. We suggest that the use of codified knowledge and 
scientific results is often intense but non-transparent. 
• Section 4 reviews the literature on industrial districts and clusters  many LMT 
activities are regionally clustered, and this section explores the reasons for and 
implications of this.  
• In the final section our preliminary arguments are recapitulated and the future 
importance of low-tech industries is underlined.  
The appendix includes a bibliography of relevant literature, a list of institutes and scientists 
conducting research on the low-tech issue as well as information about the authors. 
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1. The high-tech race 
The arguments for focusing on high-tech sectors are actually very old  they date back to 
the end of the Second World War. For the last four decades industrial researchers and 
policymakers have intensively discussed international competitiveness in a globalised 
economy characterised by international high-technology competition (Scherer, 1992; van 
Hulst and Olds, 1993). Both Americans (cf. eg. Dertouzos et al., 1989) and Europeans (cf. 
eg. Servan-Schreiber, 1967; Sharp, 1983; Freeman and Lundvall, 1988) have contributed to 
this topic, and several EU-sponsored reports have focused on assessing relative world 
strengths in technology (cf. eg. Archibugi and Pianta, 1992). 
 
One of the most persistent trends in innovation policy analysis - for more than 25 years - has 
been the identification of ICT, high technology, and science based industries with the 
knowledge economy. In recent policy discussion it is rather common to find arguments to 
the effect that the solution to perceived European economic difficulties lies with a greater 
emphasis on industries that exemplify high technology, and particular ICT output and use. 
For example, Fagerberg et al, in a recent study of European growth, argue that: 
 
 the problems that Europe faces in key areas such as growth, equality and 
employment are all related to its failure to take sufficient advantage of technological 
advances, particularly the ICT revolutionscience-based industries, particularly 
those drawing heavily on ICT, have become the main driver of technological change 
and economic growth since the 1980s (Fagerberg et al., 1999, p. 235).  
The policy conclusion from this seems very clear: 
 
what Europe has to do is to is to take steps to embed new technologies, especially 
ICTs, in society. This should bring together regulation, science and technology 
policy, and employment initiatives (op. cit.). 
There are many far less serious expressions of the same views, particularly in policy 
arguments. In policy arenas it is common for politicians and policy-makers to simply assert 
that ICT is a technology which stands alone in its impact and implications.  
 
What is the historical and intellectual basis for this focus on high-tech? It may be argued that 
this interest in science based industrial and technological development  which is what the 
high-tech discourse is essentially about  originates in four partly related forces:  
 
• the Vannevar Bush model for science and growth; 
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• the long-run development of corporate capitalism  
• the cold war 
• perceptions of Triadic competition. 
 
As regards the first, we consider that the Vannevar Bush (1945/1980) report to President 
Roosevelt on Science  the Endless Frontier laid the ground for a new paradigm which may 
be called the linear model (Stokes, 1997). The linear model is an ideological construct, a 
policy-related conception of the process of technological change. It rests on the usually 
unexamined idea that the knowledge underlying industrial production is defined by principles 
which are essentially scientific, that is, principles which have in some sense been transferred 
from scientific research. The process rests on a prior condition, which is an act of search and 
discovery - via R&D, new scientific or technological principles are elucidated, and the 
innovation process is seen as one in which the opportunities provided by this discovery are 
realised. The translation process is basically sequential  from discovery, to engineering 
development, to new product cereation and then to diffusion or spread. 
 
Bush's report, which foreshadowed the establishment of the National Science Foundation, in 
effect presented just such a science-based account of competitiveness. Its fundamental claim 
was that:  
 
Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the 
fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New 
products and processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new 
principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by 
research in the purest realms of science. ... A nation which depends upon others for 
its new basic scientific knowledge will be slow in its industrial progress and weak in 
its competitive position in world trade, regardless of its mechanical skill (Bush, 1980, 
p. 19). 
 
This kind of view about the role of science became quite widespread in documents related 
to science funding issues. But it is also sometimes expressed by more or less influential 
science policy-makers, either in the terms seen here, or as a more general statement about 
the nature of modern technology and its dependence on a science base. For example, Jerome 
Weisner, Dean of the Science School at MIT, and Presidential Science Advisor during the 
Kennedy administration, suggested that: 
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This is the nature of modern, scientifically-based technology. The first requirement is 
the existence of a body of scientific knowledge. Then the technologist must have a 
thorough understanding of the underlying science to use it as the basis for an 
invention in the solution of a specific problem. Also, more likely than not, he will 
find that the scientists who first explored the field that he is exploiting left large areas 
of ignorance which must be filled before his task can be completed. This can only be 
done by further fundamental research (Weisner, 1965, p. 33). 
 
Although it had only weak support from theory or empirical studies, this linear model 
gained strong de facto support within parts of academia as well as in policy units. This type 
of view is by no means a thing of the past, or something which is not present in current 
policy discussions.  
 
The second force relates to the development of corporate and managerial capitalism, which 
was observed already by Berle and Means (1932) and Burnham (1941) but attracted new 
interest in the 1960s (cf. eg. Baran and Sweezy, 1966 and Galbraith, 1967). Alfred 
Chandlers (1977; 1990) work in recent decades has been seminal. Hand in hand with the 
growth of big industrial corporations, the innovation processes underwent transformation, as 
did the analyses of them. This is clear in the writing of Schumpeter which shifted its 
analytical focus from the heroic entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1911/34) to the R&D 
department of the big corporations (Schumpeter, 1943/81). The argument was that 
innovation simultaneously became science-based and institutionalised in the formal R&D 
departments of large firms. Starting in the German chemical industry in late 19th century this 
phenomenon of institutionalised and large scale organised innovation rapidly diffused to 
American firms during the first half of the 20th century (Schmookler, 1957; Freeman, 1974; 
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). Around 1960 innovations were something that had to be 
managed in the R&D units (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1959/61). Despite the fact that many 
question whether it makes sense to describe either the German or America economies from 
the late 19th century as science-based this connection between large industrial corporate 
capitalism and R&D-based innovation has become an influential background notion in our 
time.   
 
The third force was the intensive discussion following after the launch of the Soviet Sputnik 
in 1957. What Nelson called orbiting evidence of un American scientific activity caused a 
general panic in Western countries about the alleged neglect of science and technology  in 
policy as well as in the traditional growth models (Nelson in NBER, 1962). This led to a 
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general increase in public-sector support in leading OECD economies in such fields as 
telecommunications, aerospace, and computing. 
 
The growing rivalry between Western countries during the 60s  after two decades of 
recovery from the second world war  may be looked upon as a fourth force although it also 
had a clear relation to the growth of big corporations (cf. eg. Servan-Schreiber, 1967). So-
called Triadic competition (Japan, Europe, USA) has since then been a continuous focus of 
attention by those who believe in the high tech race (cf. Dertouzos et al., 1989; Scherer, 
1992; Heiduk and Yamamura, 1990). 
 
Together these forces created the context for the emerging interest within the OECD (cf. 
OECD, 1971; OECD, 1981) and the European Union (cf. FAST, 1984; EUR, 1994) for the 
role of science and technology in relation to growth. It may even be argued that this process 
as a whole constitutes the cultural context for the development of innovation theory or 
economics of innovation (cf. eg. Freeman, 1974; Dosi et al., 1988; Grupp, 1998). 
 
The details of the intellectual transformation taking place during these decades would 
require a substantial study. It is obvious, however, that the role of science and technology 
for growth and development  and thus for innovations  came more into focus in the last 
four decades of the 20th century than it ever had been before. This process may, to some 
extent, be the result of a real shift in the locus of knowledge formation in industry, i.e. a 
scientification or institutionalisation of technology as argued by several authors ( 
Freeman, 1974; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). It may also be the result in part of a shift of 
focus of those analysing innovative processes; this will be analysed in the PILOT project.  
2. On the role of science in industry and technology 
2.1 The interdependence of science, technology and industry 
Much of the modern emphasis on high-tech industries rests on the idea of a scientification 
of the innovation process. In this section we discuss some of the background to this, in 
terms of the links between science and industry.  
 
The modern focus on the role of science for industrial and technical change and for society 
as a whole should not obscure the fact that many scholars have approached the topic over 
the years (cf. eg. Merton, 1938/70; Musson and Robinson, 1969/89; Schmookler, 1950). 
Whitehead (1925), and the topic therefore has a long history. These writers were clear in the 
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view that the links between scientific discoveries and the world of artefacts are far from 
simple. 
 
The Bush report, influenced by the success of the Manhattan project, was not so humble in 
its conclusions. Not only is the concept of basic research  independent of all practical ends 
 born in the report, it is also assigned the role of pacemaker of technological progress. As 
we saw above, this was followed by a conclusion on the necessity for nations to establish 
basic research to obtain a competitive position in world trade (Bush, 1980, p. 13). A 
further review of the basic research concept may lead us too far from our ambitions; but 
here it is enough to conclude that the linear model which emerged out of this reasoning  
although frequently questioned  has become attractive for science and technology policy 
makers in many countries. The basic science on which innovation allegedly rests has been 
identified as a public good, with low appropriability, as well as non-rivalry and hence 
positive externalities, and is thus well suited for publicly financed science policy (cf. Arrow, 
1962). 
 
It may be argued that the linear model, as it is deployed in the Bush report, obscures the 
importance of at least three classes of (partly related) problems: a) the duration problem; b) 
the independence of engineering and crafts and c) the endogeneity of science. 
 
The duration problem is, quite simply, the fact that there is in many cases a long period 
between the relevant scientific discoveries and inventions on the one hand and successful 
innovations on the other. For the inkjet printer, for example, the period between the first 
reported scientific results on influencing liquid droplets and a commercial printer was as 
long as 200 years and certainly more than 100 years (Laestadius, 1996). The gap between 
the discovery of the scientific principles of the laser by Einstein and the first practical 
applications was about sixty years. Duration periods of decades or even centuries should 
have implications for the use and abuse of science policy as a means to obtain short- or 
medium-term industrial and economic goals. The view within modern innovation studies is 
that duration problems tend to exist because of the complexity of technological knowledge 
bases - far more than scientific discovery is required for innovation. Production capability 
involves the integration or articulation of many different modes of knowledge, skills, and 
competences. These do not develop automatically and may well require the solution of 
problems that are far more complex than an initial scientific insight. 
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This leads us to the second problem, the status of engineering knowledge. The problem is 
whether engineering should be understood as applied science or whether it has an 
epistemology and procedures of its own, and is thus independent from natural science  
though subject to the same natural laws. This problem has attracted researchers on 
engineering knowledge formation for decades (cf. eg. Layton, 1976 and 1988; Vincenti, 
1990; Downey and Lucena, 1995). The independence (parallel) position is supported by 
results of research by Price (1965 and 1982) and by Brooks (1994) although Narin and 
Noma (1985) find that science and engineering are more intertwined in the obviously 
science based biotechnology field. However even in modern technological breakthroughs, 
like the transistor, it can be shown that the technological paths were far from given by the 
achievements of science (Gibbons and Johnston, 1982). Several decades ago Rosenberg 
(1969) made the observation that technological problems solved are just a fraction of those 
we are capable of handling, thus leaving technological development more or less 
undetermined by the scientific frontier and more dependent upon imbalances and focusing 
processes created in the technological system itself.  
 
One conclusion, out of many, which may be drawn from the conjecture of the relative 
independence of engineering, is that the influence between science and engineering may run 
in both directions. This topic, here labelled as the endogeneity of science, relates to the fact 
that throughout history science has developed on the shoulders of instruments and artefacts 
constructed by craftsmen and engineers (Rosenberg, 1992; Stokes, 1997; Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1998; Jardine, 1999; Joerges and Shinn, 2001). Technology  and its artefacts  
are not created by science  on the contrary, they often create the foundation for science, 
and scientists sometimes explain how and why existing things work rather than laying the 
foundation for inventing them. It is often the case that technologies or production processes 
generate problems that lead to major scientific breakthroughs  Pasteurs successful solution 
to the spoilage problems of the Bordeaux wine industry, or Penzias and Wilsonss solutions 
to ATTs background noise problems, each involved major scientific breakthroughs.  
 
Questioning science-based innovation models, and the scientification of technology more 
generally, leads us to a set of empirical problems. These include how innovations in practice 
occur; what is the role of science, of engineering, of craftsmanship, of design and other 
forms of knowledge processes, of market reactions, and how do these practices differ 
between technologies and industries? The Kline-Rosenberg (1986) highly interactive model 
is one way to handle that problem of complexity, and there are others as well. The Kline-
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Rosenberg model in effect sees R&D not as the foundation of innovation, but as the 
problem-solving activity of last resort  it is what firms do in an innovation project when 
they cannot solve problems with their existing sets of knowledge and skills. Stepping away 
from the linear model thus opens up how we can think about innovation, but perhaps more 
importantly it opens up how we can think about an innovating industry, and from that leads 
to new territory in thinking about economic growth. 
 
2.2 The OECD taxonomy 
Rather than facing the complexity described above, policy analysis has frequently opted for 
a strategy of simplification. It is common to see the terms 'high-technology' or 'knowledge 
intensive industries' used in a somewhat loose way, as though in fact they are both 
meaningful and interchangeable terms. But we ought to remember that the term high 
technology is itself a rather recent invention, and that its meaning is far from clear. A 
thorough analysis of the internal discussions on the linear model and on the development of 
the science and technology paradigm that emerged during the 1960s within the OECD falls 
outside the ambition of this review. However we can note that, to create a common ground 
for the analyses and policy actions of member countries the organisation began in the early 
1960s to collect and publish comparative data on science, technology and industry. The 
foundation for this activity has for a long time been the Frascati Manual, the first edition of 
which was published in 1963. The present sixth edition (OECD, 2002a) still serves as a 
common ground for collection of data on R&D.  
 
Starting in 1986 the OECD has also, based mainly on R&D data, classified manufacturing 
sectors according to R&D intensity (the percentage of total revenue allocated to R&D) 
(OECD 1986). This led originally to a three-position taxonomy: high-, medium- and low-
tech industries. The OECD distinguished between industries in terms of R&D intensities, 
with those (such as ICT or pharmaceuticals) spending more than four percent of turnover 
being classified as high-technology, those spending between one and four percent of 
turnover (such as vehicles or chemicals) being classified as medium-tech, and those 
spending less than one percent (such as textiles or food) as low-tech. A great problem for 
proponents of this classification is that the high-tech sectors are very small, and this led to 
the replacement of the three-position model by a four-position model (OECD, 1994):  
 
 high-tech industries    R&D/Turnover >  5% 
 medium high-tech industries  5% > R&D/Turnover > 3%  
  
14
 medium low-tech industries  3% > R&D/Turnover > 0.9%  
 low-tech industries   0.9% > R&D/Turnover > 0%     
 
In fact the original OECD discussion of this classification was rather careful, and offered 
many qualifications. Chief among these is that direct R&D is but one indicator of 
knowledge content. Unfortunately such qualifications were forgotten in practice, and this 
classification has taken on a life of its own. It is now widely used, both in policy circles and 
in the press, as a basis for talking about knowledge-intensive as opposed to traditional or 
non-knowledge-intensive industries. Many countries, and also the EU as a whole, have 
turned the aggregate R&D/GDP ratio into a quantitative target for science and technology 
policy as a whole. This is open to two important objections. First, R&D is by no means the 
only measure of knowledge-creating activities. Second, it ignores the fact that the 
knowledge that is relevant to an industry may be distributed across many sectors or agents: 
thus a low-R&D industry may well be a major user of knowledge generated elsewhere. 
Each of these issued will be discussed in later sections of this paper. 
 
However, it is not clear that this classification helps us, even in a limited analysis of trends. 
One major problem is that in fact the high-tech sector  as we have noted - is small, and 
there are therefore real difficulties in arguing that it can possibly drive the growth process. 
In the OECD, for example, the USA has the largest share of high-tech in manufacturing, but 
this is only 15.8% of manufacturing output, which in turn is only 18.5% of GDP. So the 
high-tech sector is less than three percent of GDP. It is hard to see how the combined direct 
and indirect impacts of such a small component of output could really be a driver of 
overall economic growth. Could it be that this sector is growing rapidly? Yes it has been 
growing, but so have other sectors, especially outside manufacturing. In virtually all of the 
OECD economies the share of high-tech in total manufacturing has risen in the longer term, 
and this is widely used as an argument for the claim that such industries are central to 
growth. However this is complicated by the fact that the share of manufacturing in total 
output has been in long-term decline. So between 1980 and 1995, for example, the high-tech 
share of US manufacturing increased from 10.5% to 15.8%, while the share of 
manufacturing in GNP decreased from 21.6% to 18.5%. What this actually implies is that 
the share of high-tech manufacturing in total GNP rose over fifteen years by well under one 
percentage point.1 Despite this, it is not uncommon to see quite sweeping claims made for 
the high-tech sector, which are not supported by readily available evidence. For example, 
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OECDs Knowledge Based Economy claims that Output and employment are expanding 
fastest in high-technology industries, such as computers, electronics and aerospace. But the 
OECDs own Scoreboard of Indicators actually shows long-term negative growth rates of 
employment in high-tech manufacturing in eleven of fifteen OECD countries for which data 
are presented (including the USA, where high-tech employment declined at a faster rate 
than manufacturing employment generally) (OECD, 1997a, p. 9).  
 
These are essentially first-level problems with any R&D-based classification. To go any 
further necessitates a more precise analysis of concepts such as science, research (basic as 
well as applied), development (as D in R&D), invention, innovation etc. As noticed by 
Rosenberg (1992) and Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) most of the activities in corporate 
R&D units do not qualify as science as normally defined. This opens up the taxonomy 
problem which is one of the core questions in the PILOT project and to which we will 
return in later analyses. 
 
It should be noted however that several of the shortcomings of the present indicators in 
capturing important aspects of industrial and technical change have been discussed among 
researchers and policy units during and since the 1990s (cf. Hatzichronoglou, 1997; 
Kleinknecht and Bain, 1993; OECD, 2002, Smith 2001). This has been an important 
impulse in the development of direct measures of innovation inputs and outputs, especially 
focusing on non-R&D inputs, and on new product innovations that can and do occur outside 
science-based industries.  
3. Knowledge formation in industry and technology  
3.1 Deficits of knowledge concepts 
The high-technology perspective is attractively simple for nations and communities that 
wish to develop knowledge-based economies. An example is a report of the Irish Science 
Technology and Innovation Advisory Council (1995): Even though the report  Making 
Knowledge Work for Us  espouses the national system of innovation as a basis for the 
development of policy, its main focus is on science and advanced technology, to be 
achieved through increasing R&D. Another example is the annual report of the German 
Ministry for Education and Research with its exclusive focus on the developmental 
perspectives of knowledge intensive economic sectors (cf. BMBF, 2002). That in itself 
                                                                                                                                                      
1  All of the data here is drawn from OECD (1997a). 
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motivates a more thorough discussion of the high-tech/low-tech concept and its analytical 
foundation. 
 
Firstly, the indicators of knowledge intensity (i.e. R&D intensity) that are typically used are 
not robust, in the sense of being consistent across industries and technologies. There is 
strong variation in the extent to which industries and technologies use R&D to create 
knowledge. On the one hand knowledge formation is organised differently across 
technologies and industries  we suggest that whether science (or research) related 
activities are more efficient or more growth inducing than other forms of knowledge is an 
empirical question and should not be postulated a priori. On the other hand there are 
differences in how industries identify their activities in relation to R&D  it is important to 
note that R&D statistics focus on the direct R&D expenditure of a firm (whether the 
expenditure leads to research carried out internally or externally). Non-R&D performing 
firms may nevertheless be participating in R&D via collective organisations or other 
indirect forms (such as monitoring university R&D results). As a result, S&T indicators 
may show a strong variation over industries and technologies as regards the real knowledge 
intensity as well as its character in a general sense. This issue of data validity also has 
implications for a correct understanding of industries and technologies growth prospects 
(cf. Laestadius, 1996, 1999; Palmberg, 2001).  
 
Secondly, several successful design oriented firms belong to industries classified as low-
tech. The design concept is vague  as is the concept innovation  and may be in need 
of a taxonomy of its own. For the moment design is not necessarily classified within the 
D in R&D according to the Frascati Manuals but there are reasons to believe that a 
taxonomy starting with design may catch other activities (and still exclude others) in 
comparison with the activities included in the present formulae. From a practical point of 
view, the definitions of R&D in the OECD's Frascati Manual, which structure R&D data 
collection in OECD economies, exclude a wide range of activities that involve the creation 
or use of new knowledge in innovation.2 The OECDs Oslo Manual explicitly includes 
                                                 
2  The development definition, on any reasonable interpretation, should include more or less all 
activities related to innovation. However the Frascati Manual contains a substantial list of 
exclusions. The most important of these are summarised in Chapter 2.3 and summarised in Table 
2.3, which gives guidance on how to divide R&D from non-R&D. Prototypes are basically included 
in R&D. Both pilot plants and industrial design are only included if 'the primary purpose is R&D'. 
We would argue that very little pilot or design activity is aimed at R&D, and therefore that most of 
these central innovation activities are excluded. All improvements in production processes are 
excluded from R&D. On the other hand, trial production is included 'if it implies full scale testing 
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design activity and the surveys based on it collect data on design expenditures. Expenditure 
on design turns out to be an important predictor of innovation performance at firm level. 
 
IKEA, Benetton and H&M are good illustrations of the importance of design. IKEA  
belonging to the very low-tech end of OECD classification of industries  has created a 
capability in design (for manufacturing and for use) and logistics. Benetton and H&M also 
combine design, marketing and logistics in new forms within the framework of mature 
industries.3 This innovativeness outside the realm of the S&T paradigm may be illustrated 
by a recent airport best-seller by Kelley and Littman (2001). Although not scholarly, this 
book invites the reader to a world dominated by creativity and high competence among 
highly educated innovators in a Silicon Valley based design firm. Most of their design 
solutions are far from the S&T frontier, yet in fact they are useful, profitable  and low-tech.  
 
Thirdly, the character of the specific knowledge created in several of low-tech industries, 
and its relevance for innovative capabilities has not been given the attention it deserves. 
This is important for companies, regions and indeed entire economies. Significant parts of 
that knowledge may be characterised as predominantly practical or application-
oriented, distinct from theoretical or scientific knowledge, and resembling what 
Michael Polanyi (1966) has termed implicit knowledge in contrast to explicit 
knowledge. It may be also argued that the very essence of engineering activity is design 
oriented. Design can be understood as an intention to create artefacts or technical solutions 
rather than understanding, and is therefore not part of R&D. We might argue that design and 
engineering development are focused on the specificity rather than the general (cf. eg. 
Vincenti, 1990 and Petroski, 1996), but this does not make these activities less 
technologically or economically significant. The complexity of knowledge formation in 
technology and industry is thoroughly analysed by Wendy Faulkner (1994; cf. also Faulkner 
and Senker, 1995) who also provides a typology of knowledge used in innovation, where 
(experimental) R&D is just one family of knowledge among others (Faulkner, 1994, p. 
447). One conclusion that may be drawn from the work of Faulkner is that analysis of 
knowledge formation in industry and technology has to start in direct empirical research 
                                                                                                                                                      
and subsequent further design and engineering'. Trouble shooting, patent and licence work, market 
research, testing, data collection and development related to compliance with standards and 
regulations are all excluded. Obviously there are difficult boundary prblems for defining R&D. But 
an important point arising from this is that many innovation-related activities in LMT industries asre 
likely to be excluded from measured R&D (OECD 2002a, pp.34-50). 
3  Indeed, it could be argued that much of the clothing industry, and certainly the designer 
  
18
capturing the variety across different realms of technology rather than in indirect collection 
of R&D data. 
 
Fourthly, a recent study on the dynamics and characteristics of firms relations to external 
repositories of knowledge (Hales et al., 2001), demonstrates that a distinction between 
knowledge as furnished by external repositories or knowledge bases and the productive 
competence underpinning firm-level innovation and behaviour is essential for understanding 
the learning processes of innovating firms. Rather than knowledge intensity, this implies 
that the relevant driver is competence intensity. Although formulated somewhat 
differently this perspective is present in several discourses on knowledge formation and 
creation of firm capabilities. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) for example use the concept 
absorptive capacity and Teece et al. (1997) and Zollo and Winter (2002) use dynamic 
capability to address these issues. The competences and capacities are not necessarily 
R&D-based, and may involve many non-technological dimensions. 
 
Case studies on competence intensity  facing similar problems of measurement and 
taxonomy  reveal that the intersection of knowledge intensive and competence intensive 
industries is far from total. This is still more obvious if the analysis is extended outside the 
manufacturing sector. For example, even with very conservative criteria normal hospitals 
show low knowledge intensity (R&D is done elsewhere) and high competence intensity 
including a very high skilled staff. In the extension of this family of arguments we face the 
complexity of knowledge formation in networks, in supply chains and in qualified 
purchasing relations. The dynamics and synergies within these structures and collaborative 
relations are far from easy to capture and locate to specific actors/industries when using 
traditional S&T indicators (cf. Coombs et al., 1996; Laestadius, 1996). 
 
Finally, we might question the validity of any knowledge indicators or knowledge analysis 
that are not sensitive to context conditions. Can we adequately analyse the specific features 
of innovation and production processes through a more or less isolated approach to 
knowledge or should knowledge be related to its context? Our view is that knowledge 
formation is highly context specific.4 This means that if we seek to reveal the specific type 
and form of knowledge and its relevance to technology and industry, we must focus on its 
                                                                                                                                                      
clothing sector, is based entirely on innovative design. 
4  In this sense, knowledge is to be comprehended as a socially determined phenomenon and 
should not be mixed up with pure data and information (cf. Nonaka, 1994, pp. 15; Willke, 1998, pp. 
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connection with the action and work context in each case. Such studies have been done on 
the level of laboratories and breakthroughs of new technological solutions (cf. Latour, 
1987). With respect to traditional manufacturing, the work by Böhle et al. (1992) should 
be mentioned. It demonstrates the relevance of the informal side of work organisation and 
experience-based knowledge to the efficiency of highly standardised and automated 
production processes. As for the investigation of the seemingly low knowledge-intensive, 
low-tech work processes, one may come to the conclusion that only the analysis of the 
whole production and work process makes it possible to draw conclusions on the question 
whether  and if so  which forms of knowledge are really constitutive of them.  
 
In short, there is a need to reconsider the prevailing understanding of the dynamics of 
technology and industry. In other words, the black box called knowledge has to be opened 
and analysed seriously across industries. In the following, some preliminary steps will be 
taken in this direction focusing on three domains of core importance to the low-tech 
discourse. 
 
3.2  Codified knowledge in low-tech industries 
We have argued that the most basic mistake in high-tech models is the tendency to identify 
high-R&D activities with knowledge intensive industries, and hence to see high-R&D 
activities as bearers of the knowledge economy. We suggest on the contrary that LMT 
sectors are characterised by complex knowledge bases, involving major engineering, design 
and production knowledges, and important dimensions of practical knowledge (see section 
3.4). At the same time, we argue that the focus on direct performance of R&D in the high-
tech/low-tech classification hides the fact that most low-tech industries in fact do use 
research results and formal or codified scientific knowledges in their products as well as 
high-tech devices in their production systems.  
 
The key issue in understanding the role of R&D and science in LMT knowledge bases is to 
recognise that although LMT sectors use formal R&D results and codified knowledge, often 
in deep and extensive ways, such knowledge use is usually non-transparent. This is because 
such knowledge tends to be created via interactive processes in other institutional locations, 
and to flow via mechanisms that are only rarely captured with current indicator methods.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
6). 
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This refers to modern innovation theory according to which the complexity of the array of 
agents within an economy, and the complexity of the interactions between them can be 
regarded as a key element of innovation processes. Systems theories of innovation in 
particular, which stress the interactions between knowledge-producing agents, point to the 
idea that economic knowledge is a complex outcome of such interactions. The relevant 
agents for knowledge production include firms, of course, but also universities, research 
institutes, government labs, granting councils, consulting companies (particularly 
engineering consultancies), standards-setting or certification agencies, and in some cases 
(such as for open source software) user groups. From this perspective knowledge creation 
and use is a socially collective process. This means firstly that it is misleading to think of 
knowledge creation in terms of simply the internal R&D performed by a firm (which is 
what is implied by using R&D intensity indicators as a measure of knowledge intensity). 
Secondly, it is misleading to think, as argued in some new growth theory literature, of a 
single knowledge-producing sector that supplies generic knowledge to the rest of the 
economy. Neither of these conceptions, although immensely popular in both academic and 
policy discourses, gives us any grasp of the real problems of scientific knowledge creation 
and use in society because of their failure to incorporate complexity or any of its 
implications. 
 
From the point of view of firms, the creation and management of knowledge involves 
system integration. Integration activity is partly a matter of integrating knowledge from 
different sources, and partly a matter of integrating knowledge with other production-
relevant competences. The matter of practical knowledge and related competences has 
already been discussed. Here we focus on the role of scientific or other codified knowledges 
in LMT industries.  
 
The main problem here lies in how to conceptualise the knowledge bases of industries, in 
the context of the complexity of agents sketched above. If we think of knowledge bases in a 
comprehensive way, then they should include all of the direct and indirect knowledge inputs 
relevant to the output of a final product: that is, the totality of the knowledge produced by 
all of the agents contributing to product outcomes. Even a cursory examination of LMT 
products suggests that these knowledge bases are complex, with many inputs of formal, 
codified and scientific knowledge results. In wood products, for example, even the first 
cutting of a wooden log in a sawmill might involve complex pattern recognition 
technologies using algorithms aimed at the maximisation of yield. In vehicle assembly, 
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high-grade adhesives are normally used, and these are the outcomes of basic R&D in 
chemistry. In food processing, both production and monitoring require instrumentation 
technologies based on microbiology, bacteriology, and informatics. Modern synthetic 
textiles are the results of decades of R&D in the chemical industry. These simple examples 
can easily be deepened and multiplied, and this is an important research task if we are to 
gain a full understanding of knowledge complexity. But the general point here is that LMT 
sectors are not understandable via any distinction between knowledge-intensive and non-
knowledge intensive sectors. LMT sectors are intrinsically knowledge intensive in 
important ways. 
 
This is not simply a matter of passively absorbing knowledge from outside. Many of the 
arguments concerning generic technologies or general purpose technologies simply repeat 
the logic of the linear model of innovation, in seeing action in one sphere generating the 
outcomes elsewhere. However complexity of LMT knowledge bases is matched by the 
complexity of relations among knowledge producing agents. The incentives for the 
development of high grade inputs to LMT sectors are often internal to the LMT sectors 
themselves  that is to say, it is performance specifications and desired product attributes 
generated as aims within LMT sectors that shape the incentives and evolution of the very 
high-tech sectors that are alleged to  drive economic growth. So not only are LMT sectors 
resting on complex codified and/or scientific knowledge bases, they are generating the 
depth and complexity of their knowledge bases endogenously. 
 
These inter-agent or inter-industry flows conventionally take two basic forms, embodied 
and disembodied. Embodied flows involve knowledge incorporated into machinery and 
equipment. Disembodied flows are sometimes referred to as spillovers, but this is an 
excessively abstract term because it implies an automatic process, in which recipient firms 
are rather passive. In fact accessing disembodied knowledge is an active process, 
transmitted through scientific and technical literature, consultancy, education systems, and 
movement of personnel. 
 
The basis of embodied R&D flows is the fact that most research-intensive industries (such 
as the advanced materials sector, the chemicals sector, or the ICT complex) develop 
products that are used within other industries. Such products enter as capital or intermediate 
inputs into the production processes of other firms and industries: that is, as machines and 
equipment, or as components and materials. When this happens, performance improvements 
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generated in one firm or industry show up as productivity or quality improvements in 
another. The point here is that technological competition leads rather directly to the inter-
industry diffusion of technologies, and therefore to the inter-industry use of the knowledge 
which is embodied in these technologies. The receiving industry is not necessarily just a 
recipient of such technology: it may actively promote its development (specifying technical 
and performance functions to producer firms, for example), and must certainly develop the 
skills and competences to use these advanced knowledge-based technologies (cf. 
Laestadius, 1998). Most LMT industries are major users of such technologies, and the 
knowledge underlying them is part of the overall knowledge base of LMT industries. 
 
As examples, consider fishing and fish farming, both of which are apparently low 
technology sectors in terms of internal R&D. These are a large industries worldwide, with 
aquaculture growing particularly strongly; this is moreover an important growth sector for 
developing countries.  Examples of embodied flows in fishing include use of new materials 
and design concepts in ships, satellite communications, global positioning systems, safety 
systems, sonar technologies (linked to winch, trawl and ship management systems), optical 
technologies for sorting fish, computer systems for real-time monitoring and weighing of 
catches, and so on.  Within fish farming, these high-technology inputs include pond 
technologies (based on advanced materials and incorporating complex design knowledges), 
computer imaging and pattern recognition technologies for monitoring (including 3D 
measurement systems), nutrition technologies (often based on biotechnology and genetic 
research), sonars, robotics (in feeding systems), and so on. These examples are not untypical 
of low-technology sectors  on the contrary, most such sectors can not only be 
characterised by such advanced inputs, but are as we have noted arguably drivers of change 
in the sectors that produce such inputs. 
 
We can note that the underlying knowledge for fishing and fish farming mentioned are 
advanced and research-based. Ship development and management relies on fluid mechanics, 
hydrodynamics, cybernetic systems, and so on. Sonar systems rely on complex acoustic 
research. Computer systems and the wide range of IT applications in fisheries rest on 
computer architectures, and specific programming research and development. Even 
fishponds rest on wave analysis, CAD/CAM design systems, etc. Within fish-farming the 
fish themselves can potentially be transgenic (resting ultimately on research in genetics and 
molecular biology), and feeding and health systems have complex biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical inputs, and well as foundations in studies of fish behaviour. In other words a 
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wide range of background knowledge, often developed in the university sector, is absorbed 
in the fishing and fish farming sector. 
 
We would argue that these examples represent a general case in LMT industries, requiring a  
fundamental reappraisal of our assessment of the relative knowledge intensity of industries. 
This issue will be an explicit focus in future  PILOT studies. 
 
3.3 Codification and the tacit dimension 
One of the key elements of modern innovation theory has been also a strong distinction 
between tacit and codified knowledge in production and innovation. This leads to a 
temptation to argue that a distinction between high-tech and low-tech industries can rest on 
the idea that high tech sectors are intensive users of codified knowledge, while low-tech 
sectors are based on tacit knowledge. As already shown, we would reject this temptation, 
because there is no total correspondence between low-tech activities and tacit knowledge 
based activities. There is low-tech outside the domain of tacitness as well as tacitness 
outside the realm of low-tech. The non-science based character (by definition) of low-tech 
activities contributes however  when analysing these activities  to a focusing on those 
elements of creativity, professionalism and skills which are normally connected with 
tacitness.  
 
The concept itself  usually credited to Polanyi (1958/74 and 1966)  is of recent origin 
within this domain of social science although it is frequently referred to today, primarily 
within management theory (cf. eg. Nonaka et al., 2001). Nelson and Winter (1982) make 
early and path-breaking references to Polanyis work. With some exceptions, however, 
discourses related to industry and technology have waited until the new millennium to adopt 
the tacit dimension (cf. the special issue of Industrial and Corporate Change, 2000). The 
concept is hard to comprehend precisely; since it is frequently defined in connection with 
the concept of explicit knowledge, and an abundance of synonyms for it are used within the 
debate in the sociology of knowledge (cf. Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001).5 
 
Based on Polanyis epistemological perspective, tacit knowledge can be defined as follows 
(cf. Lam, 2000): Firstly, explicit knowledge can be codified, stored and transferred whereas 
tacit knowledge is intuitive and unarticulated. Knowledge of this type is action-oriented and 
                                                 
5  Eg. the discourse on artificial intelligence (cf. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986). 
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has a personal quality that makes it difficult to formalise or communicate. Secondly, explicit 
knowledge can be generated through logical deduction and acquired by formal study. In 
contrast, tacit knowledge can only be acquired through practical experience in a specific 
context. Thirdly, explicit knowledge can be aggregated at a single location, stored in 
impersonal forms and utilised without the participation of the knowing subject. Tacit 
knowledge is person- and context-bound. It has a distributive character and cannot be easily 
aggregated. Polanyis claim was that the origin of all human knowledge is based on tacit 
knowledge generated through individual intuition. 
 
The proposition on the existence of a tacit dimension is provocative and has caused an 
academic discussion which by far extends beyond the intended low-tech focus of this paper. 
However the debate on tacit knowledge is relevant to our work in number of ways, mainly 
because it points to variations in the methods of acquiring and using knowledge. For 
example, it is usually argued that tacit knowledge is acquired at work in an inductive and 
explorative way  through learning-by-doing. Furthermore, it is supposed to be composed of 
technical skills and segmented into more or less established work practices, i.e. rules or 
routines. These work practices and rules are not necessarily person-bound, they are rather 
work norms accepted collectively by the employees or the community in question. This 
leads directly to the collective dimension of knowledge, which  due to its co-operative 
character  must not be ignored when analysing work processes. Collectiveness concerns 
knowledge which is stored in the rules, procedures, routines and shared norms of a work 
process as well as the factors which guide the problem-solving activities and patterns of 
interaction among its members.6 In this sense, the collective side of knowledge is rather to 
be found between than within individuals. It can be more or less than the sum of the 
individuals knowledge, depending on the mechanisms that translate individual into 
collective knowledge (cf. Lam, 2000, p. 491). The arguments by Teece and Pisano (1998) 
are similar and link this to competitiveness: the ability to translate (individual) resources to 
(firm) capabilities is what constitutes firms competitiveness. So while we reject the idea 
that tacitness of knowledge is the only defining characteristic of low-tech activities, it is 
clear that this concept elations towards important problems in knowledge creation and 
learning.  
 
                                                 
6  In this sense, the collective dimension of knowledge refers to the phenomenon which is also 
called the collective mind of organizations (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
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3.4 Practical knowledge 
In order to address such problems, in the context of low-tech industries, and to avoid some 
of the epistemic problems of the tacitness concept, we may use the concept practical 
knowledge. Here we refer to knowledge acquired through the ongoing process of 
production, developed and transmitted on the basis of learning-by-doing/using. Such 
knowledge shows an individual and a collective dimension and it has a highly informal 
character. Practical knowledge is often not documented or covered completely by work 
instructions, operation plans and documentation rules. It refers to the informal side of a 
working process often marked by accepted working methods as well as co-operational and 
communication patterns, which, however, are not to be found in any official organisation 
chart.7 They are accepted, carried out and controlled by the employees involved. Such 
knowledge is based on collective experience and commonly shared norms on how a 
working process should take an effective and efficient course. Practitioners tend to know 
that this may result in clear differences from the officially and formally planned working 
organisation. Such differences are, nevertheless, absolutely essential for workability and 
innovation ability. 
 
Practical knowledge can be recorded  unofficially  in personal documents and notes. A 
widely known example is the operators of computer-controlled machine tools who operate 
machines by means of unofficial programs which are often unofficially modified. This 
modification of the programs allows a fine tuning of the operations so that the production 
process might be much more efficient than if it was run with the official programs. 
 
Practical knowledge is also marked by the fact that it cannot be clearly separated from 
codified and theoretical knowledge. A number of studies on the course of innovation 
processes in companies have shown that practical knowledge is always marked by double 
openness. Bearers of practical knowledge often seem able to adapt and to use knowledge 
acquired scientifically and systematically in order to cope with specific work problems.8 
Practical knowledge is often the precondition for systematic work rules or engineering and 
technological findings, prototypes and other products. In other words, practical knowledge 
                                                 
7  In contrast to the formal side of an organization as the planned and officially defined rules 
system of an organization. It is a generally known fact that the functionality of an organization is 
based on the interplay of both the formal and the informal side (cf. Mayntz, 1966). 
8  This has been instructively shown by investigation results of very different social-science 
disciplines such as innovation economics (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Faulkner and Senker, 1995), 
sociology of technology (cf. Asdonk et al., 1991) and sociology of knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; 
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is in reality closely connected with codified knowledge. In this sense, practical knowledge 
shows high potential for development with its bearers proving to be very capable of 
learning. Thus, the above-mentioned modification of NC programs is based on the 
competent and experience-based adaptation of a given codified knowledge in the form of 
the programs developed in the programming department and the logical and syntactic rules 
of a programming language. Another instructive example, described by Laestadius (1995), 
is the absorption of external R&D results in a company producing anchor cables. It concerns 
the adjustment of given material parameters to the actual requirements of a forging process 
whose course is hard to calculate. Obviously, this requires a high degree of practical 
experience in employees. A third example of this phenomenon is work processes of 
engineers in construction and development departments. These processes are based on the 
engineers skill, i.e experience and instinctive feeling, enabling the application of 
systematically and scientifically acquired knowledge to the relevant problem in order to find 
solutions (cf. Wengenroth, 1999).  
 
However, practical knowledge can also pass into officially codified knowledge by being 
recorded in technical documentation and databases. So, the content of the foremans black 
book can turn into official work instructions and documentation; the operator informs the 
planning department about modifications, and they are added to the next official program 
for the computerised machine tools and stored in the database for these programs. In other 
words, these are processes of knowledge conversion between practical and theoretical 
knowledge  this appears to be common practice in many companies. These conversion 
processes can be considered as a central prerequisite for innovations, since in this way new 
knowledge is created. This may also be the way for transforming disembodied knowledge 
into embodied (cf. Laestadius 1998). Nevertheless, these processes are not unproblematic, 
as shown in particular by Nonaka (1994), and complex requirements often have to be met.9 
Nevertheless, this is a major process of knowledge creation which is unrecorded by 
available indicators and much innovation analysis, yet of vital importance for understanding 
the knowledge dimensions of low-tech industries. 
 
In analysing the role of LMT sectors in the knowledge economy, we can start from the 
hypothesis that in industries with low R&D intensity we will find a type of knowledge 
which comes very close to the outlined features of practical knowledge in a special way. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995;Willke, 1998).  
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According to Laestadius (1995), this kind of knowledge proves particularly successful for 
solutions to technical problems and for intelligent variations of solutions to well-known 
problems, eg.:  
• the ability to handle daily specific product materials such as developing and processing 
specific steel alloys in order to prolong the life-cycle of, for instance, machines used in 
agriculture; 
• the know-how and the experience needed to guarantee the smooth running and the 
improvement of complex production plants  
• the mastering of processes and logistics in order to improve the processing flexibility 
and the market position of a company 
• the competence for a customer-specific interpretation of mature products such as anchor 
chains on the basis of often incomplete information and specification, and for adjusting 
it, at the same time, with flexibility to the required technical procedures. 
 
A characteristic feature of the production processes of significant segments of the LMT 
sector is its reliance on knowledge that is on the one hand created and reproduced through 
learning-by-doing as well as using, empirical trial-and-error, and limited systematic 
training. On the other hand LMT firms are characterised by a certain absorptive capacity, 
i.e. the ability to integrate and utilise codified and scientifically produced elements of 
knowledge from different, often external sources. In other words, the LMT knowledge base 
is complex, deep and systemic. 
 
3.5 On the efficiency of intelligent low-tech organisation 
The effective use of practical knowledge requires sophisticated enterprise organisation. In 
relation to how low-tech companies mobilise their specific practical knowledge, a broad 
spectrum of reorganisation and innovation strategies have been identified in case studies of 
German companies (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000; Schmierl, 2000). They range from a far-
reaching technical-organisational restructuring of the entire production process to partial 
and gradual steps of reorganising certain functions. The organisation must make it possible 
to continuously use the practical knowledge available and to develop and adjust it in 
response to new requirements. For low-tech companies, this often means a break with 
inherited Tayloristic structures characterised by a strictly-defined division of labour, 
highly repetitive tasks and the use of mostly semi-skilled or even unskilled workers. As 
                                                                                                                                                      
9 See also in detail Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
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shown by Schmierl (2000) but also Hamngren et al. (1995) advanced reorganisations of 
industries have led to mobilisation of creativity and knowledge which, in many cases, have 
contributed to significant productivity increases and higher quality performance. 
 
According to the literature dealing with problems of knowledge management, this requires 
organisational structures enabling intensive interaction and communication between the 
employees involved and, consequently, a continuous exchange of knowledge as well as 
collective learning processes. Cross-functional and self-organising teams, which show a 
high degree of functional redundancy and low task specification of the employees (cf. Aoki, 
1988; Nonaka, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), are considered to 
be one central element of such organisational forms. The argument is that cross-functional 
teams integrate and synthesise knowledge across different areas of expertise serving as a 
bridge between the individual and the organisation. Interaction, learning and knowledge 
diffusion  vertically as well as horizontally  is most efficient if it takes place on team level 
(Lam, 2000, p. 498). Of course, a lot of additional organisational conditions are necessary, 
if knowledge mobilisation is to work properly. The consistent integration of the teams into 
organisational basic structures, ensuring orientation and stability, is central to the existence 
of a company culture conducive to knowledge. 
 
It may be argued that the reorganisation of industrial work (i.e. knowledge management) in 
order to mobilise the hitherto hidden competencies in the staff challenges our traditional 
understanding of the concept innovation. If routine production is mechanised and 
(virtually) all employees work creatively, the distinction between innovative and non 
innovative activities will be blurred.  
 
Referring to the results of the aforementioned case studies (cf. Hamngren et al., 1995; 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000; Schmierl, 2000) the effective reorganisation strategies of low-tech 
companies depend heavily on the utilisation of external conditions and supportive factors. 
Establishing relations with other companies, organisations and institutions is an activity 
even low-tech industries cannot do without. External collaboration helps in overcoming the 
limitations of a firms own resources and know-how in developing new production and 
innovation potential.  
 
As is the case with a number of branches of industry, vertical co-operation with suppliers 
and distributors has also been gaining in importance for low-tech manufacturers. In many 
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cases relatively loose and order-dependent connections have been extended and intensified 
in order to optimise the time for delivery, to reduce storage costs, and, first and foremost, to 
test and probe the potential for the development of the product mix. In order to make co-
operation easier, companies very often set up relations with suppliers in their region, in 
order to maximise face-to-face collaboration.  
 
However, it may be assumed that co-operation strategies of companies differ between 
countries with specific industrial cultures and traditions. For example, cases of horizontal 
co-operation with direct or indirect competitors are rare in Germany. Though such strategies 
are not ruled out in principle as interviews with management representatives showed (cf. 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000), compared to eg. The Third Italy or the furniture industry in 
Flanders (cf. Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; Maskell, 1998) they play a minor role in the 
actual business. The reasons for such regional differences will be further analysed in the 
PILOT project (see below section 5). 
 
4.  Localised industrial creativity  not necessarily high-tech 
The strength of Silicon Valley in maintaining its early dominant position in the global ICT-
boom during the 80s and 90s has provided inspiration to analysts and policy makers as 
regards the dynamics of high tech clusters and science parks (cf. eg. Swann et al., 1998). It 
should be noticed, however, that the dynamics of localised industries seem to be 
independent of their R&D intensity. In fact it may be argued that competitive industrial 
districts to a large extent develop  or at least have developed  around LMT industries and 
technologies. This is the case in, for example, the furniture industry all over Europe 
(Lorenzen, 1998; Maskell, 1998; Jacobson and Mottiar, 1999; Mottiar and Jacobson, 2002), 
Italian knitwear (Solinas, 1982) and ceramic tiles (Porter, 1990, pp. 210-225) as well as the 
Swedish Gnosjö region which is extremely low-tech and has a population with a relatively 
low level of education, but is highly entrepreneurial. 
 
The idea that proximity contributes to more rapid development of, and diffusion of, 
practical knowledge emanates from the work of Marshall (1890). Among the factors 
Marshall identified as advantages of localisation was hereditary skill. What Marshall 
was referring to in this context, was not a genetic inheritance. The reference is, rather, to a 
situation in which a large number of people lived and worked  using similar, specialised 
skills  in close proximity. The skills in production of the particular product become so 
well-known in the area after a generation or two that they become almost common 
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knowledge in that place; children learn many of them unconsciously. Inventions and 
improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organisation of the business 
become quickly known and copied. There is a milieu that encourages this diffusion. People 
meet and, through both business and social interaction, share their knowledge. This is what 
Krugman (1993) refers to as technological spillovers, the more or less pure externality that 
results from knowledge spillovers between nearby firms. 
 
Marshalls ideas have contributed to the theory of industrial agglomeration (Jacobson et al., 
2002). This is more than just a group of firms in the same place, or a spatial concentration. 
What distinguishes an industrial agglomeration from a spatial concentration is the presence 
of agglomeration economies. These are benefits that a firm derives from the fact that there 
are other firms located in the same place. They are a subset of what Marshall (1890) 
described as external economies. Knowledge spillovers are an example of this kind of 
external economy. 
 
Marshalls work also provided the theoretical basis for the analysis of what has come to be 
known as Third Italian industrial districts. Emilia-Romagna in Italy has been a particular 
focus of attention, because of its ceramic tile, wooden toys, textiles and clothing, and furniture 
industrial districts, among others. As can be seen from the traditional nature of these products, 
the innovativeness of the LMT industrial districts is concentrated in their industrial organisation 
and production processes. 
 
There is a close relationship between the now vast literature on industrial districts  both in 
the Third Italy and elsewhere  and work on learning and innovation. Systems of innovation 
theories, for example, attributing a critical role to technological, organisational and 
institutional learning in the process of innovation, stress that learning is an interactive and 
socially embedded process (Lundvall, 1992; Fischer, 2001). Industrial districts, in which 
inter-firm co-operation is facilitated by spatial proximity, provide support for the idea that 
spatial proximity is important in promoting interactive learning, innovation and the 
development of competitive advantage. Lorenzen (2002) takes this idea further, providing 
theoretical arguments for ascribed trust being at the heart of the way in which a kind of 
shared understanding develops in networks of firms. Some of this can be codified, 
especially in relation to hard information such as business data on revenue and profits. 
This does not particularly require proximity. In addition, even exchange of complex, tacit, 
and embodied information  though requiring trust, and frequent face-to-face 
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interactions, and though helped to some extent by proximity  is not severely inhibited by 
geographical distance. However, to derive benefit from high levels of social trust, sharing 
in local culture, being part of a community and their rich social capital, does require close 
proximity. The social learning processes that create social codebooks ... are constrained by 
geography, Lorenzen argues, and hence cultures arise locally  for example in industrial 
clusters. All these are highly tacit, the costs of their development appear nowhere (and 
certainly not under R&D expenditure), and yet they contribute substantially to the 
innovativeness of what Lorenzen calls industrial clusters. His contribution to the 
development of theory in this area provides a basis for relating the social and cultural to the 
economic, in a way particularly relevant to LMT industries. 
 
Organisational proximity is of a non-material and non-market nature (Burmeister and 
Colletis-Wahl, 1997, p. 235), and it presupposes the existence of shared knowledge and 
representations of the environment within which the firm exists (Hudson, 1999, p. 64). 
Through interactions in intra-industry relations, co-operation and collective learning 
processes, organisational proximity creates a capacity to assemble fragmented information, 
tacit knowledge and other non-material and non-standardised resources. Information 
originating outside the network is received in a qualitatively better way, due to 
organisational proximity among the actors. Organisational proximity is viewed as a 
prerequisite for collective learning processes, and for co-operation among different 
organisations in the creation of new resources and innovation. While organisational 
proximity is a necessary condition for creating innovations and resources through processes 
of collective learning, it is also simultaneously a product of the process of collective 
learning. 
 
Heanue and Jacobson (2002) provide empirical evidence of organisational proximity in the 
case of a dispersed network of three firms in the furniture industry in Ireland. They show 
that these firms share values, meanings, understandings and tacit knowledge and a common 
set of institutions through which these features are produced. The most important mediating 
institution in this case was the Irish industrial development agency, Enterprise Ireland. The 
individual involvement of each of the firms over time in various industry initiatives with 
Enterprise Ireland not only contributed to the development of a shared worldview, but it 
also enabled the firms and institution together to identify suitable partners for the current 
network.  
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The empirical focus of this work was a geographically dispersed formal network. In 
contrast, Dahl and Pedersen (2003) examine the case of regionally clustered informal 
networks. The theoretical context of their work is the recent importance attached to the role 
of informal networks in the development of regional clusters. In particular, informal contact 
between employees in different firms is argued to be one of the main carriers of knowledge 
between firms in a cluster. They empirically examine the role of informal contacts in a 
specific cluster. The analysis, based on a questionnaire sent to a sample of engineers in a 
regional cluster of wireless communication firms in Northern Denmark, shows that the 
engineers acquire and share valuable knowledge through informal networks. The authors 
argue that this shows that informal contacts are important channels of knowledge diffusion. 
Again it must be emphasised that firms gaining from this diffusion of knowledge do so 
without any specific R&D effort; in this case the firm gains without any explicit effort at all. 
Clustering and knowledge exchange of these types appear to be a pervasive feature of LMT 
industries (Isaksen 1998), and it is this that links the innovation and growth potential of 
LMT industries to important regional issues in Europe. 
 
5. The future of low-tech sectors  
To summarise the preliminary arguments: it appears that the intelligent and successful 
production of low-tech products presupposes both a specific practical knowledge available 
to companies, and the indirect use of complex knowledge inputs which are often scientific 
in character. This view accords with the recent revival of the debate in the social sciences, 
dealing with the growing importance of knowledge-intensive work and the need for 
organisations to learn and to develop know-how. These phenomena are generally regarded 
as characteristics of an emerging knowledge-oriented society. As emphasised at the 
beginning of this paper, these ideas reflect important tendencies of social development. 
However the activities of several LMT companies without any doubt fit into this perspective 
 not only do such enterprises make intensive use of the knowledge available to them; they 
also develop it, restructure their organisations accordingly, innovate and grow. 
 
This means that knowledge and knowledge-based innovation strategies cannot be regarded 
as features of expanding and new sectors, such as professional services, ICT/software or 
biotech. Without a doubt, these sectors must be regarded as markedly knowledge-based, 
since they are immediately dependent on the use of explicit knowledge. But as the findings 
presented here suggest, phenomena relevant to the debate may also be found when one 
studies other types of knowledge in industrial core industries  industries that from the point 
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of view of an emerging knowledge-based society may seem outdated and far from future-
oriented. Such sectors are not marked by gradual erosion  instead they are repositioning 
themselves in the context of socio-economic change. In spite of globalisation and growing 
competition, prospects are good in markets for mature products. Partly this is because the 
specific practical knowledge low-tech companies are provided cannot easily be used by 
potential competitors. For this knowledge, as mentioned above, can be deeply embedded in 
the social system of a company and its local environment, which makes it hardly 
transferable and accessible to competitors (cf. Maskell, 1998). This applies  paradoxically 
 to standardised products which can considered to be easy to imitate. But such products are 
often design-intensive, and have major potential for technological upgrading via the use of 
complex (often scientific) knowledge inputs. 
 
These arguments lead to a specific understanding of the restructuring of the economic 
landscape of Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. This change does not appear as a 
wholesale structural replacement of old sectors with new ones, or as substitution of 
old technologies with new ones. It evolves as a restructuring of sectoral and 
technological systems, transformed more from within than from without. This change 
process is not dominated by industrial activities where competitive advantage, capability 
formation and economic change are constituted by frontline technological knowledge. 
Rather, it is dominated by what are often wrongly termed low- and medium-tech industries. 
There are many who argue that, since high-tech industries and knowledge-intensive 
industries are one and the same, the economic health of Europe depends simply on the 
capacity to create and nurture so-called high-technology industries. These industries, 
particularly the information technology and telecommunications (ICT) cluster, are regarded 
as the bearers of growth, employment and trade success in the future. The policy conclusion 
tends to be that innovation policy, technology policy and, indeed, economic policy more 
generally ought to be focussed primarily on the creation of ICT industries. 
 
From the perspective of this paper this type of analysis, and the analytical and policy 
conclusions that result, are deeply flawed. The concepts and categories used to describe 
allegedly high-tech, knowledge-intensive industries are seriously oversimplified, lacking 
empirical support, and conceptually naïve. Rather, we claim that: 
 
• The innovation systems of Europe and indeed of most industrialised countries are 
strongly influenced by low-tech industries. 
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• The products of these industries are often growing rapidly and in surprising ways, as a 
consequence of quality improvements and technological upgrading 
• The knowledge bases of these industries are deep, complex and systemic. They are 
intensive creators and users of practical knowledge and high-grade design skills. They 
use engineering and scientific knowledge and are closely integrated with the science and 
technology infrastructure. The mere fact that they do not do much internal R&D says 
nothing at all about knowledge intensity or their contribution to the knowledge 
economy. 
• They are very often embedded in specific regional structures and are part of regional 
company networks that differ from country to country and are part of specific national 
and regional innovation systems.  
 
Furthermore, the involvement of low-tech products and companies is frequently a core 
precondition both for the innovativeness of value chains  or production systems  and for 
the design, fabrication and use of a range of high-tech products. Collaboration and 
networking between companies of different industries at regional, national, as well as 
transnational levels, are increasingly becoming important determinants of the 
innovativeness and competitiveness of individual companies. These value chains, filières or 
clusters include low-tech companies not just as tiered participants in supply chains or as 
more-or-less passive receptors of technologically advanced machinery and equipment 
developed independently of user specifications. On the contrary, the dynamics and 
efficiency of value chains may be crucially dependent on the reliability and effectiveness, 
the capabilities and specific knowledge of their low-tech partners and on their integration 
into innovation processes in other firms in the cluster, whether low-tech or high-tech. It has 
to be emphasised that the focus on low-tech firms as parts of wider value chains implies an 
immediate inclusion of service functions, whether supplied by independently organised 
service firms, as secondary industrial activities of other firms or through intra-firm 
production of ancillary services.  
 
This focus on the contribution of low-tech industries for the innovativeness for industry in 
general is extremely important in a policy perspective, both national and regional innovation 
policies and for developing a proper foundation for the overall growth and performance 
possibilities of the European economy. The development of the low-tech sectors is of great 
importance for both old industrialised and more recent high-tech economic countries and 
regions. Following the arguments above, the high-tech prospects for many economies are 
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based on the presence and dynamic interaction of reliable low-tech functions and 
processes. This holds particularly true for value chains which have an increasingly global 
character and can be regarded as one of the driving forces of the economic development. 
This aspect is of outstanding importance for the future development of the Central European 
countries, since many low-tech processes are located there and they are more and more 
integrated into the internationalised value chains. But we are confident in asserting that the 
development of Europe as a whole will in future years be based largely on the competitive 
and innovative capabilities of the LMT industries discussed here.  
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